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“Textualism” is a very general and abstract term that represents a 
variety of views about the interpretation of legal texts.  One strand of 
textualism is conceptual and descriptive; this strand makes claims about 
what texts actually mean.  Another strand of textualism is normative; 
this strand makes claims about how judges ought to interpret particular 
kinds of legal texts, such as constitutions and statutes.  In the first part of 
this paper, we consider an especially strong form of conceptual 
textualism—the position that texts can be interpreted without any 
reference, express or implied, to the meaning intended by the author of 
the text.  The defining feature of this form of textualism is the insistence 
that intentions play no role in the production of meaning, and so we call 
this view “intention free textualism,” or “IF textualism.”  We do not 
know if anyone actually is an IF textualist so defined, although loose 
remarks by some self-identifying textualists suggest that they might hold 
this position.  In any event, whether or not IF textualists actually exist, it 
will be useful to drive a stake through the heart of intention free 
interpretation.  Doing so will make it clear that what is at stake in the 
dispute between textualists and intentionalists1 does not concern the 
conceptual points about what interpretation is and what determines texts’ 
meanings.  Rather, the actual dispute is a normative one over whether 
interpreters should look to the intentions of actual authors or 
hypothetical ones, and when, if we are to look to actual authorial intent, 
 
 1. By intentionalist, we mean one who claims that the meaning of a text is 
determined by what its actual author intended it to mean.  By actual author, we do not 
mean to restrict ourselves to the person or persons who mechanically produced the marks 
or sounds in question—that is, the text.  For us, the author can be one who adopts for his 
own purposes a text another has produced.  Thus, Congress is the actual author of its 
statutes, even if legislative aides did the actual drafting.  And judges are the actual 
authors of their opinions, even if written entirely by law clerks.  (Of course, it is possible 
that an actual author intends whatever the drafter intended, in which case the author’s 
intent incorporates by reference the drafters’ intent.) 
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policy considerations (such as rule of law concerns) should lead us to 
ignore certain evidence of that intent. 
Part I, therefore, establishes that IF textualism is a conceptual 
impossibility.  Regardless of what position people claim to hold, no one 
can be such a textualist.  Part I will establish that one cannot interpret 
texts without reference to the intentions of some author.  Indeed, texts 
can only be identified as texts by reference to authorial intent.  All of 
this is consistent, of course, with the possibility that one author might 
appropriate the marks made by another author and intend a meaning by 
them that is different from the meaning intended by their creator.  It is 
also consistent with a reader’s imagining what a text would mean had 
someone other than its actual author composed it.2  Leaving these 
possibilities aside, however, Part I establishes that one cannot interpret 
texts without reference to the intentions of some author. 
In Part II we address how the actual meaning of a legal text—what its 
author(s) intended it to mean—might differ from the authoritative 
meaning that an authoritative interpreter gives it.  Essentially, such a 
divergence is possible whenever the authoritative interpreter is debarred 
from considering certain types of evidence of authorial intent.  The 
divergence actually occurs when the excluded evidence, had it been 
considered, would show the authorial intent to be different from what it 
appears to be given the restricted set of evidence. 
In Part II we also consider the various interpretive postures that 
textualists might be advocating (assuming that they are not advocating 
IF textualism).  What they are arguing against is clear enough, namely, 
full blooded intentionalism.  Full blooded intentionalists consider all 
available evidence of the actual author’s intended meaning.  A proponent of 
full blooded intentionalism might exclude certain evidence of intent on 
grounds of its general unreliability.  But he nonetheless would allow 
consideration of all reliable evidence of authorial intent.  This position is 
the “wholeheartedly faithful agent” position, contrary to what some 
textualists claim for their own position. 
If full blooded intentionalism is textualism’s foil, what positions might 
textualists be taking in opposition?  One possible textualist posture is 
that authoritative interpreters should exclude certain evidence of the 
 
 2. Just to be clear, we shall argue in Part I that one must envision an author 
attempting to convey some meaning if one wishes to discern the meaning of a text.  Part 
I is not meant to show that interpretation is possible only if one examines the intent of 
the actual author.  We consider the idea of hypothetical authors in Part II. 
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actual author’s intended meaning for various policy reasons (call this 
policy constrained interpretation).  Thus, such textualists might exclude 
evidence of the intended meaning that is not generally available to the 
public, or that is manipulable by lawmakers, even if such evidence 
generally tends to prove the meaning intended by the lawmakers.  The 
policy rationales for such evidentiary exclusions are rule of law ones.  
Indeed, it is conceivable that the rules of exclusion might vary 
depending upon whether the authoritative meaning—the intended 
meaning disclosed by the restricted set of evidence—is broader or 
narrower than the actual meaning (the intended meaning disclosed by all 
the evidence).  Or the rules might vary depending upon whether the law 
is directed primarily to the general public or to technical experts, or 
whether it is criminal or civil. 
Whenever the authoritative interpretation based on a restricted set of 
evidence differs from the meaning we think was actually intended—because 
we have viewed the excluded evidence—then the authoritative interpreter is 
less than a wholeheartedly faithful agent of the lawmakers.  After all, the 
authoritative interpreter is not giving the law the meaning most likely 
intended by its authors (based on all we know) but is instead ascribing a 
meaning derived from a restricted set of evidence.  Nonetheless, rule of 
law considerations may support this less than wholehearted faithfulness.  
For instance, many support on policy grounds the practice of stare 
decisis in statutory and even constitutional interpretation, even though 
the application of stare decisis suggests that the authoritative interpreter 
is not acting as a faithful agent of the lawmaker.3  Nonetheless, 
whenever an authoritative interpreter follows stare decisis (or adheres to 
any other policy constrained interpretive posture), what the authoritative 
interpreter deems the law to mean is, in some sense, not what it really 
means—that is, not what the actual lawmakers meant by it. 
A second possible position is to interpret the law as readers (the 
median reader?) actually do interpret it with whatever evidence, and 
with whatever misconceptions, they happen to possess about the actual 
author’s intentions.  This position, while conceivable, appears morally 
undesirable.  The authoritative interpreter is essentially deferring to 
some median man on the street, who knows less than the authoritative 
 
 3. Whenever the precedent incorrectly interprets the intentions of the lawmakers, 
application of stare decisis in subsequent cases is obviously inconsistent with courts’ 
being faithful agents of the lawmakers.  (Of course, lawmakers might endorse stare 
decisis as a doctrine, even if stare decisis occasionally thwarts its will; but this does not 
mean its will is not thwarted in those instances.)  Even when the precedent correctly 
interprets the intentions of the lawmakers, so that application of stare decisis in 
subsequent cases does not result in a departure from those intentions, the courts applying 
stare decisis will not be acting as the lawmakers’ faithful agents; rather, they will be 
acting as faithful agents of the precedent setting court. 
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interpreter about the actual author’s intended meaning.  Moreover, the 
restrictions on the evidence available to those polled, and how those 
polled are selected, introduce indeterminacy or arbitrariness into this 
methodology.  Finally, if the polling extends beyond a tiny number of 
people, it may, because of Arrow’s Theorem,4 lead to the result that 
there is no authoritative meaning. 
A third posture is that of giving the law the meaning an idealized 
reader would give it.  In other words, we construct an idealized reader, 
give her some evidence of actual authorial intent—not all, because then 
she would give the law its actual intended meaning—and then ask what 
intent she would ascribe to the author based on that limited set of 
evidence.  Constructing an idealized reader looks arbitrary or indeterminate.  
Though textualists have sometimes advanced this idea, we do not 
understand the benefits of hypothesizing an ideal reader.  It is difficult to 
see why we would do this rather than just restrict the evidence before the 
actual interpreter. 
The first three positions leave an important role for the actual author.  
In all of them, authoritative interpreters are involved in a search, either 
directly or indirectly, for the intentions of the actual author.  A fourth 
possible position is to have the interpreter construct an idealized author 
of the text and ignore the actual author.  This position asks what an 
author with specified attributes would have meant by the law in 
question.  One version of that position is Dworkin’s make the law “the 
best it can be,”5 which naturally becomes “the law just means what I 
would morally prefer that it mean.”  There are other versions, however, 
depending upon what attributes we give our idealized author, including 
the language he speaks, whether he ever uses technical or secondary 
definitions, his facility with grammar and punctuation, and how rational 
and just he is.  We think this interpretive posture suffers from 
arbitrariness and indeterminacy as well because by positing the right 
author, one can have text mean whatever one wishes. 
We think the only plausible contenders are full blooded intentionalism 
and policy constrained interpretation.  Whatever one chooses to call 
these postures, that is where the battle ought to be joined.  The normative 
question ought to be whether (and to what extent) policy considerations 
ought to intrude into interpretation and cause constructed, authoritative 
 
 4. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 2–8 (2d ed. 
1963). 
 5. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 348 (1986). 
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meaning to diverge from the actual, authorial meaning.  Whatever the 
answer to this normative question, as a descriptive matter, we think it 
clear that intentions must matter in interpretation. 
I.  THE CONCEPTUAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF INTENTION FREE TEXTUALISM 
Self-described “textualists” hold a variety of positions on how one 
ought to interpret legal texts.  Indeed, there does not appear to be any 
canonical description of textualism.  At most, what unites textualists is 
their stated refusal to consider the intentions of the laws’ authors to 
determine what the laws mean.  We shall argue that such IF textualism is 
a conceptual impossibility—that authorial intentions constitute the 
meanings of texts.  If we are right, a charitable reading of textualists’ 
statements would not attribute IF textualism to them.  Nevertheless, at 
times, self-described textualists say things that appear to endorse IF 
textualism. 
Consider the most famous modern textualist, Justice Antonin Scalia, 
and his discussion of textualism in A Matter of Interpretation.6  Justice 
Scalia’s version of textualism seems to have three principal tenets.  The first 
is that a textualist searches for an “objectified” intent—the intent an idealized 
reader who knows the entire corpus juris would gather from the particular 
statute.7  The second is that textualists do not seek to enforce the “subjective 
intent of the enacting legislature.”8  The third is that legislative history 
should not be used as “an authoritative indication of a statute’s meaning.”9 
The first is the most important principle, as the other two follow from 
it.  The reason for searching for an “objectified” intent is “that it is 
simply incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even with 
fair government, to have the meaning of a law determined by what the 
lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated.”10  After 
all, “[i]t is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.”11  
Legislators may intend whatever they want, “but it is only the laws that 
they enact which bind us.”12  To govern by “unexpressed intent” is 
tyrannical in the same sense that Nero’s posting of laws high up a pillar 
was so: people will not be able to make sense of the law if they try to 
discern the subjective intent of the legislature.13 
 
 6. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW (1997). 
 7. Id. at 17. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 29–30. 
 10. Id. at 17. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
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Justice Scalia derives the second principle from an examination of 
what judges actually do in practice.  If the intent of the legislature 
mattered, then judges would not apply the rule that “when the text of a 
statute is clear, that is the end of the matter.”14  Likewise, if legislative 
intent was the touchstone, judges would not assume that the enacting 
legislature was aware of all existing laws.  Instead, they would pay 
attention to the text and the legislative history of the particular statute in 
isolation, for that is all the legislators likely had in mind.15 
The third principle follows directly from the first.  If only objectified 
intent matters, then legislative history, which yields only indications of 
subjective intent, should not be viewed as relevant.16  But, argues Scalia, 
even if the legislative intent was the touchstone of statutory interpretation, 
we should not look to legislative history to discern legislative intent.  To 
begin with, on most contested matters brought before a court, there will 
be no legislative intent.  On relatively detailed matters, it is “beyond 
belief” that a majority of both houses entertained any view.  “For a virtual 
certainty, the majority was blissfully unaware of the existence of the 
issue, much less had any preference as to how it should be resolved.”17  
Moreover, legislative history is likely to be a highly unreliable indicator 
of any legislative intent that might exist.  Members of Congress often do 
not read committee reports, much less prepare them.18 
Justice Scalia’s explication of textualism raises a series of questions.  
Is his version of textualism a quest for the intentions of the legislature 
with certain evidence barred from consideration (like legislative history), 
or is legislative intent completely irrelevant even when known with 
certainty?  It appears on balance that Justice Scalia adopts the latter 
approach—actual legislative intent is always irrelevant.19  We are unsure 
 
 14. Id. at 16. 
 15. Id. at 16–17. 
 16. Id. at 30–31. 
 17. Id. at 32. 
 18. Id. at 32–34. 
 19. However, at times Justice Scalia writes as if legislative intent does matter.  See 
id. at 20–21 (discussing scrivener’s error doctrine and declaring that it is okay to correct 
statutes where there is a mistaken expression).  We read his discussion of scrivener’s 
error as evincing concern for actual legislative intent, at least where there is supposedly a 
clear mistake of expression.  Properly speaking, if legislative intent did not matter at all, 
statutes could not contain errors.  After all, to speak of scrivener’s “error” or of legislative 
misspeaking is to suggest that what matters is not the objective meaning of the text but 
the intent of the person(s) who erred. 
However, it is possible to understand Justice Scalia as instead claiming that an 
idealized reader will conclude that the authors (idealized or otherwise) made a mistake in 
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whether Justice Scalia is truly an IF textualist, however, because of his 
use of the concept of “objectified” intent.  To speak of objectified intent 
might be to acknowledge that the intent of some author matters.  
Nonetheless, his reference to “objectified” intent, when placed in the 
context of the other statements quoted above, can be taken to mean that 
the text is meaningful apart from the actual author’s intent.20 
Our object here, however, is not exegetical.  We do not care whether 
Justice Scalia—or other textualists such as John Manning21—really are 
IF textualists.  What we want to show is that such a position is a 
conceptual impossibility.  We leave it to others to determine if any self-
described textualist actually holds the position we discredit. 
A.  Argument One: Texts Cannot Declare the Language in                        
Which They Are Written 
One cannot attribute meaning to marks on a page or to sounds without 
reference to an author, actual or idealized, who is intending to communicate 
a meaning through the marks or sounds.  Consider the question of how 
to identify the relevant language of some communication.  IF textualists 
cannot explain how they identify the language of the text they wish to 
interpret.  Apparently, they assume that identifying the relevant language 
is unproblematic.  Seeing the word “canard,” an IF textualist who speaks 
English will assert that the word means “fib.”  After all, that is the 
ordinary, public meaning that would come to mind for the well-
informed, reasonable English speaker.  But a French textualist will 
attribute a different meaning to the word.  To the French IF textualist, 
“canard” clearly means “duck” because that is the ordinary, public 
meaning for the well-informed, reasonable French speaker.  Which of 
 
expression and will fix it regardless of actual legislative intent.  For instance, suppose a 
bill enacted on January 1, 2013 contains a sunset of January 1, 2004.  Even if one could 
prove that the entire Congress actually wanted to have a sunset of January 1, 2004 
(because they really did not want the bill ever to become operative), the idealized reader 
might find a “mistake in expression” and correct it to read January 1, 2014.  Here, it is 
possible for the idealized reader to find and correct a legislative “error” where there is 
none. 
 20. If intent plays a role in Scalia’s textualism, Scalia might believe that 
interpreters ought to search for the intentions of some idealized author.  We discuss this 
interpretive posture in Part II of this paper. 
 21. Professor Manning has claimed that intent is a necessary concept for 
textualists.  See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 16–17 n.65 (2001).  He suggests that the interpreter is to imagine a legislature 
that enacts laws against a backdrop of interpretive conventions establishing that actual 
legislative intent is irrelevant.  See id.  Thus, the interpreter is supposed to assume 
hypothetical legislators who intend that their subjective intentions be irrelevant in 
interpreting the statutes they pass.  We doubt the coherence of a legislature’s intention 
that its own intentions be disregarded.  The position is paradoxical. 
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these IF textualists is right?  We believe that IF textualists cannot 
meaningfully answer this question.22 
Along the same lines, consider the following amusingly bewildering 
statement: “I am speaking English, not Schmenglish,” which in 
Schmenglish means “I am speaking Schmenglish, not English.”  Is this 
statement in English or Schmenglish, and how will IF textualists decide?  
Once again, we do not believe that IF textualists have an answer, or at 
least an answer that does not smuggle in reference to authorial intent. 
Our claim is that we must posit the existence of some author if we are 
to attribute meaning to these statements.  If we know the real author of 
“canard” generally speaks French, we most likely would conclude that 
“canard” in this context means “duck.”  If the author usually speaks 
English, we most likely would conclude that it means “fib.”  If we are 
unaware of (or indifferent to) the author’s usual tongue (and likely 
intentions), we may imagine what we would have meant had we spoken 
the term, imagining ourselves as the authors. 
This is not merely a problem across languages.  Even within English, 
these issues arise.  If someone walks into a restaurant and declares “I 
would like some chips,” what is meant by “chips?”  Once again, we 
think we should understand “chips” by reference to the intentions of the 
speaker.  If he is American, we might assume he means something like 
potato or tortilla chips.  If he is English, we might assume that he means 
what Americans generally call french fries.  If we do not care about 
satisfying the speaker’s request, we might decide that the sentence 
means what it would had a techie uttered it, in which case “chips” might 
refer to microchips.23 
 
 22. It is possible that IF textualists might claim that both textualists in our 
hypothetical are right.  It all depends upon the audience one assumes.  If one assumes the 
relevant audience speaks English, then the reasonable person in that audience would read 
“canard” as “fib.”  But this gives up the game because it constitutes an admission that 
there is no objectified meaning.  Indeed, even within a particular language one can 
narrow the audience in a number of ways and yield different meanings.  Of course, it is 
our contention that the correct audience to assume is that audience that would attribute 
the meaning intended by the author(s). 
 23. Textualists are likely to respond that modern textualism takes into account the 
“context” in which the language was spoken or written, thereby eliminating some of the 
indeterminacy and indicating whether microchips, potato chips, or fries is the proper 
meaning.  As we explain later, we believe that invocations of context amount to 
unacknowledged invocations of authorial intent. 
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B.  Argument Two: Texts Cannot Declare That They Are Texts 
An even more fundamental problem for IF textualists is that texts 
cannot declare that they are texts or even declare which part of the 
putative text constitutes the text.  Suppose a monkey typed the U.S. 
Constitution in our casebook.  Are the ink marks made by the typewriter 
keys a text?  We think not, unless one posits a hypothetical author with 
intent to convey a meaning.  Without an author, real or hypothetical, intending 
to convey a meaning through these marks, our seemingly grand Constitution 
is nothing but a randomly generated mass of inked shapes that merely 
resembles a text.  Or suppose a Martian composed the Constitution in 
our casebook, and that Martians treat what we take to be spaces between 
letters and words as the actual letters and words, and regard what we 
take to be letters and words as the actual spaces.  If that is correct, then 
the “text” in our casebook is quite different from the text that we assume.  
The text that we assume to exist is actually no different in kind from 
meaningless marks made by waves on the beach, or by cloud formations 
in the sky; it is merely the meaningless residue of the Martian’s text. 
Our simple point is that one cannot look at the marks on a page and 
understand those marks to be a text (that is, a meaningful writing) without 
assuming that an author made those marks intending to convey a meaning 
by them.  The reason why no one treats the Constitution as a bunch of 
unintelligible lines and curves is because everyone assumes a particular 
kind of author for the Constitution.  A few originalists latch onto the 
Constitution’s actual drafters (the Framers); others focus on those who 
purported to make it law (the Ratifiers); perhaps a majority insist on a 
search for “original meaning,” referring thereby to the meaning that an 
idealized, contemporary reader would have attributed to the document.24  
“Living Constitution” advocates typically assume an author with the desires 
and fears that animate them and hence read the Constitution as if they 
had written it.  Still others seem to rely upon multiple authors, 
sometimes reading portions of the Constitution as it would have been 
understood by the Founders, and other times reading the Constitution as 
if it were written yesterday by a modern, well-meaning chap.  Whenever 
someone reads the Constitution or any other text, he explicitly or 
implicitly does so with an author in mind.  And he has no choice but to 
do so. 
 
 24. Given our argument about the necessity of envisioning an author, the idealized 
reader contemplated by some originalists will have to hypothesize an author (actual or 
idealized) to make sense of a putative text.  Hence, the idealized reader construct does 
not eliminate the need for some kind of author from which one can derive meaning.  We 
explore this type of textualism in Part II. 
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C.  Argument Three: Meaning Cannot Be Autonomous from Intent—One 
Must Always Identify an Author 
This argument builds upon the previous one.  Consider some people 
who come upon marks on the ground that are shaped like a “c,” an “a,” 
and a “t.”  They begin to debate whether the marks mean “domestic 
tabby cat,” “any feline,” or “jazz musician.”  They are then told that the 
marks were made by water dripping off a building.  Their debate over 
meaning should now cease: no author, no meaning.25 
Suppose now that they know that a person made the marks.  They 
encounter him and tell him of their debate.  He tells them that he never 
intended to make letters.  Rather, he was marking out the contours of 
patches of a vegetable garden.  The debate over meaning ought to cease: 
no intended meaning, no meaning. 
Now suppose that the person did seek to make a word.  The people 
debate the meaning of “cat.”  The “author” then informs them that he 
was writing an ode to his beloved tabby.  That should settle the debate: 
“cat” here means tabby.  The alternatives—any feline and jazz 
musician—are just as much off the table as they were in the previous 
examples of no author and no intended meaning. 
The same point applies to other examples of “mindless” “texts.”  If 
“trunk” is produced by an elephant who paints with his trunk, or by 
legislators each drawing letters randomly from a hat, it is useless to ask 
whether it means the main axis of a tree, the rear storage compartment of 
a car, or the nose of an elephant, or even what language it is in.  Without 
an author who intends a meaning, such marks are meaningless.  “Texts” 
without authors and intended meanings are not texts; and texts with 
intended meanings are texts only with respect to the intended 
meanings.26 
 
 25. If they continue to debate the meaning, they must be debating what the marks 
would have meant if, contrary to fact, an author intending to convey a meaning had made 
them.  Because they are each free to imagine a different hypothetical author, there is no 
single correct answer to the question they are debating.  Only if they agree on the 
characteristics of a hypothetical author—for example, what would most jazz columnists 
have meant by “cat”—does it become answerable.  But notice that even if they play this 
game, they are not debating the meaning of the marks made by the dripping water; 
rather, they are debating what the marks would have meant had they been made (or 
appropriated) by particular people intending to convey some meaning thereby. 
 26. Put a different way, texts are individuated by their intended meanings.  
Consider the word “cats” that I cut out of a magazine article on “The Big Cats of Africa” 
and paste it into my ode to tabbies.  In the magazine article, those marks meant one 
thing—lions, leopards, and cheetahs—because that is what the article’s author meant by 
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D.  Argument Four: Texts Can Have “Deviant” Meanings             
Because Those Meanings Are Intended 
How did “cat” come to mean jazz musician?  Because it was used by 
some people with the intent that it be understood as referring to a jazz 
musician.  That is ultimately how all words acquire their meanings.  And 
the word “cat” meant jazz musician the very first time it was used with 
such an intention, even before it was listed as a definition in the 
dictionary.  Similarly, if a speaker says “Gleeg, gleeg, gleeg,” it means 
what the speaker intended it to mean, even if to others it sounds like 
nonsense.27  And if your mom is Mrs. Malaprop, and she asks you to 
make sure the “autobahn” is pulled next to the sofa when she comes to 
visit you—and you know that she intends for you to move the 
“ottoman”—then if you are a dutiful child, you will pull up the ottoman 
and not attempt to relocate a German highway.28  “Strategery” has 
entered into common use (at least in some circles) as a synonym for 
“strategy.”  It acquired that meaning as soon as Will Farrell of Saturday 
Night Live so used it; and it continues to have that meaning because 
President Bush, his political aides, and the public continue to so use it. 
E.  Argument Five: Unexplained Exceptions to IF Textualism: The Use 
of Context, the Avoidance of Literal Absurdities, and Casualness 
Regarding Punctuation 
People who might be IF textualists frequently soften their textualism’s 
hard edges by adopting a number of moves that seem inexplicable given 
IF textualist premises.  For instance, such textualists are quick to admit 
that texts must be read in context.  They agree that a “keep off the grass” 
 
them.  In my poem, those identical marks mean something else because that is what I 
intend by them.  The marks themselves contribute to two different texts, distinguished by 
two different authorial intentions.  They are capable of bearing an infinite number of 
meanings, just as an infinite number of marks, sounds, or other forms of conduct are 
capable of referring to lions or to tabbies. 
By contrast, the shape of the marks in the Constitution found in the National Archives 
varies from the shape of the marks in the Constitution found in most casebooks or indeed 
the Spanish translation of the U.S. Constitution.  Yet we take these various marks to 
mean the same thing because we assume the same authors with the same intention. 
 27. “Gleeg, gleeg, gleeg” is the attempt at a reductio that textualists throw up at 
intentionalists.  The problem is that it is not reductio.  “Gleeg, gleeg, gleeg” can be as 
meaningful as the third base coach’s pulling on his ear with the successful intent to 
convey the idea “Bunt!” 
 28. Is Mrs. Malaprop misspeaking in English, or is she speaking 
“Malapropenglish”?  Is slang that has yet to be validated by the Oxford English 
Dictionary “English” or something else?  We cannot see that this is answerable in any 
way other than by arbitrary stipulation.  What we can say is that it does not matter 
insofar as we are trying to discern what Ms. Malaprop means by “autobahn.” 
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sign usually means something different on a lawn from what it means 
over a drug counselor’s office.29  But why should we take context into 
account?  And what additional information do we include within 
“context?”  The additional contextual information is, unsurprisingly, 
information that provides evidence of the intent of the actual author.  
For example, writing in dissent in Smith v. United States, Justice Scalia 
invoked context to adopt a narrow reading of the phrase “using a 
firearm” as it appears in a federal criminal statute.30  But the context he 
invoked clearly was meant to reveal the intentions of an author:  
When someone asks, ‘Do you use a cane?,’ he is not inquiring whether you 
have your grandfather’s silver-handled walking stick on display in the hall; he 
wants to know whether you walk with a cane.  Similarly, to speak of ‘using a 
firearm’ is to speak of using it for its distinctive purpose, i.e., as a weapon.31   
Properly speaking, an IF textualist should be unconcerned with what the 
author intends as opposed to the objectified intent—what the utterance 
means to a reasonable user of the language.32  But here Scalia seems to 
invoke the speaker’s intent. 
We believe that context is universally regarded as relevant only 
because it is evidence of authorial intent.  Indeed, the commonplace 
truth that all understandings of texts are contextual just demonstrates that 
all texts qua texts acquire their meaning from the presumed intentions of 
their authors. 
The same general criticism applies to invocations of the absurdity and 
scrivener’s error doctrines.  Those who seemingly advance an IF 
textualism use these doctrines to avoid the odd readings that application 
of such a textualism would yield.  In so doing, these scholars once again 
back away from their strong textualism by bringing in authorial 
intentions through the backdoor.  For to say that some reading is absurd 
and therefore ought to be rejected is to say nothing more than that the 
author of the text could not have intended such a reading.  Recognizing 
the intentionalist foundations of the absurdity doctrine, some textualist 
 
 29. See Gerald Graff, “Keep off the Grass,” “Drop Dead,” and Other 
Indeterminacies: A Response to Sanford Levinson, 60 TEX. L. REV. 405, 407–08 (1982).  
Graff’s discussion of the context invokes hypothetical situations where one considers 
what the author likely meant. 
 30. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994)). 
 31. Id. at 242. 
 32. Keeping in mind the earlier point that the language is itself a product of 
authorial intent, language cannot exist, much less be understood, in the absence of intent. 
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scholars (to their credit) have criticized prominent judicial textualists for 
their recourse to the absurdity doctrine because implementation of that 
doctrine is ultimately a means of effectuating the intent of the 
legislature.33 
Even the most ardent strong textualists cling to the scrivener’s error 
doctrine, however.34  In his recent attack on the absurdity doctrine, John 
Manning briefly discusses and defends a narrow scrivener’s error 
doctrine in a footnote.  “[W]hen an internal textual inconsistency or an 
obvious error of grammar, punctuation, or English usage is apparent 
from reading a word or phrase in the context of the text as a whole, there 
is only the remotest possibility that any such clerical mistake reflected a 
deliberative legislative compromise.”35  But the existence of a legislative 
compromise must be irrelevant to the IF textualist.  IF textualists claim 
that when Congress passes legislation, it does not matter whether any 
member has actually read the legislation.  Hence, it cannot matter 
whether some provision was an intended compromise as opposed to a 
mistake.  Moreover, so far as the IF textualist is concerned, there can be 
no “errors” in statutory text.  The text results from the clash of interests, 
and it is whatever it is, warts and all.  To speak of errors, mistakes, or of 
a “legislature [that] obviously misspoke,” as Justice Scalia has,36 is to 
have a baseline of legislative intent, for it is only against that baseline 
that it is possible to speak of legislative misspeaking.37 
For an IF textualist, a statute means what it would mean to “a skilled, 
objectively reasonable user of words.”  So if a statute containing ten 
provisions about “cars” has an eleventh dealing with “cas,” the eleventh 
should be understood as gibberish, no more meaningful than Judge 
Bork’s Ninth Amendment inkblot.38  To correct the mistake is to pay 
 
 33. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV.  2388, 2391 
(2003); John C. Nagle, Textualism’s Exceptions, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: 
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, ARTICLE 15, at 1 (2002), available at 
www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art15. 
 34. John C. Nagle is the only textualist we know of who has rejected the 
scrivener’s error doctrine.  See Nagle, supra note 33, at 4. 
 35. See Manning, supra note 33, at 2459–60 n.265. 
 36. See SCALIA, supra note 6, at 21. 
 37. In a world where judges actually applied IF textualism, legislators opposed to 
particular bills would have incentives to slip in “mistakes,” knowing that true blue 
intention free textualists would not “correct” them.  We mention this, not as an argument 
against intention free textualism, but as an argument that one cannot regard apparent 
“mistakes” as necessarily unintentional.  Some “mistakes” might well be intentional. 
 38. We are reminded of a Gary Larson cartoon that by itself is a reductio of IF 
textualism.  In it, a plane is flying over a desert island on which a haggard, disheveled 
man has carved in the sand H-E-L-F and is now waving his arms at the plane.  The 
caption, representing the co-pilot’s words to the pilot, reads “Wait!  Wait! . . . Cancel 
that, I guess it says ‘helf.’”  The co-pilot is obviously a committed IF textualist.  See 
Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All?  The Intentions of Authorities and the Authority 
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homage to the false god of legislative intent.39  One would be either 
implementing actual legislative intent or implementing the intent of 
some hypothetical legislator (an author who intended to refer to cars).  
Either way one would be abandoning the stand against the use of 
intentions in discerning the meaning of the text. 
In this vein, consider the embarrassing (for IF textualists) Seventeenth 
Amendment.  The Seventeenth Amendment famously replaced state 
appointment of Senators with popular election of Senators.  But if one 
paid no attention to the actual authors’ intentions, the amendment would 
seem to have required popular election of the Senate for a six-year 
period only.40  If one completely unaware of the intent behind the 
Seventeenth Amendment were asked to make sense of it, it would seem 
that he would read it to require a temporary six year trial of popular 
election for Senators.41  We believe that those who seemingly champion 
IF textualism ignore the rules of punctuation in reading the Seventeenth 
Amendment for the same reason they ignore absurd readings—because 
they know the actual authors did not intend them.  Invocation of context 
only helps the textualist if the context supplied to the interpreter goes to 
the intention of the Seventeenth Amendment’s authors and shows the 
punctuation to be a mistake.  Otherwise, it is hard to see how one can 
view the amendment as making a permanent change in how Senators are 
selected. 
Our claim is not merely that seeming proponents of IF textualism have 
embraced a host of exceptions that are inconsistent with IF textualism’s 
core premises.  Others have already made that assertion.42  Instead, our 
claim is that these exceptions all point in one direction—toward a 
 
of Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 366 (Andrei 
Marmor ed., 1995). 
 39. Some might argue that we are caricaturing textualism by insisting that faithful 
intention free textualists cannot rely upon the absurdity and scrivener’s error doctrines.  
After all, some such textualists believe that they can hold onto such doctrines.  We hope 
that we have not caricatured textualism.  Instead, our goal is to point out how IF 
textualism would apply shorn of its ill-fitting excrescences. 
 40. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be 
composed of two Senators from each state, elected by the people thereof, for six years; 
and each Senator shall have one vote.”). 
 41. That is the reading produced by giving the commas the meaning that standard 
grammar would give them.  See Peter Jeremy Smith, Commas, Constitutional Grammar, 
and the Straight-Face Test: What if Conan the Grammarian Were a Strict Textualist?, 16 
CONST. COMMENT. 7, 14 (1999). 
 42. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
41–47 (1994). 
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healthy (but underappreciated) concern for authorial intent.  That is why 
we believe that many textualists, despite their protestations to the 
contrary, are ultimately interested in the intentions of actual authors.  
What produces confusion is that although textualists often claim that 
authorial intentions do not matter, operationally they act as if authorial 
intentions do matter.  This explains our extreme reluctance to characterize 
any self-described textualist as an IF textualist. 
***** 
IF textualism is an impossibility.  Although some textualists might 
claim to be completely unconcerned with authorial intentions, they have 
no choice but to attend to them.  Indeed, many textualists seem to pay 
attention to legislative intent in particular when they invoke the absurdity 
and scrivener’s error doctrines.  But the inevitability of recourse to 
intentions is also true in a more fundamental way.  We cannot know the 
language of the text without reference, at least implicitly, to the language 
(and its meanings) that the authors intended to speak, and without 
allowing for the possibility—indeed, probability—that the authors 
intended a nonstandard variant of some standard language.  Indeed, we 
cannot identify marks or sounds as texts without implicitly assuming 
authors and intended meanings. 
II.  THE REAL ISSUES IN INTERPRETATION:                                                  
EVIDENCE AND IDEALIZATION 
If IF textualism is an impossibility because one must always have 
recourse to some author, real or otherwise, what other positions could 
textualists be advocating?  We know that they are rejecting full blooded 
intentionalism of the sort in which interpreters gather all the evidence 
available of the authorially intended meaning.  That position is their foil.  
Moreover, their position would not be a fundamental alternative to 
intentionalism if their claim were merely that one ought to exclude from 
consideration on grounds of unreliability some evidence of the authorial 
intent—for example, some forms of legislative history.  No full blooded 
intentionalist should advocate use of unreliable evidence of authorial intent. 
As we see it, this leaves textualists with four possible positions.  First, 
textualists might wish to exclude certain evidence of authorial intent for 
reasons other than its unreliability but otherwise interpret as would an 
intentionalist.  This position is one that we believe is tenable, although it 
perhaps problematically rests on norms that must be deemed superior in 
authority to those posited by the lawmakers whose laws are being 
interpreted. 
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Second, textualists might advocate interpreting laws based on asking 
some sample of readers—or some median reader—what meaning they 
believe the actual authors intended.  This position is unattractive for a 
host of reasons. 
Third, textualists might advocate interpreting laws based on the 
intentions that a purely hypothetical construct—an idealized reader—would 
attribute to the law’s author.  We find this position, to the extent it 
differs from the first one, to be quite problematic. 
The fourth textualist position would have the interpreter read the text 
as if it were written by, and thus carried the intended meaning of, an 
idealized author.  We find this position to be perhaps the most problematic 
of all. 
A.  Position One: Textualism as Rule of Law Restricted Intentionalism 
According to this version of textualism, the interpreter should seek out 
authorial intent, but in doing so should refuse to consider certain kinds 
of evidence thereof, even if reliable.  For example, we might have 
reliable evidence that a law, which appears to be written in standard 
English and which can be given a sensible meaning therein, was actually 
written in nonstandard English, or Schmenglish.  We could imagine an 
interpretive norm to the effect that lawmakers will be irrebuttably 
presumed to use standard English in writing laws.  We might tell a rule 
of law story about the justification of such a norm, such as the need for 
the general public to know the laws, and so forth.  And we might give a 
similar rationale for excluding even reliable legislative history—that is, 
that such history is not generally available, or that it can lead to 
nontransparent manipulations of the lawmaking process. 
We find this version of textualism coherent and perhaps plausible.  To 
accept it, however, we would need to see clear statements of the specific 
norms excluding various types of evidence of lawmakers’ intentions and 
what the provenance and authority of those norms was deemed to be.  
Notice that because the evidence of authorial intentions excluded by 
such norms is reliable evidence, the interpreter will end up in a situation 
in which the authoritative meaning of the law is different from what the 
interpreter knows was the meaning intended by the lawmakers.  To 
many, this will not be a devastating criticism; for in applying stare 
decisis to statutory and constitutional interpretations by courts, the courts 
countenance a similar gap between authoritative meanings and actual 
meanings.  Moreover, if our interpretive norms exclude certain kinds of 
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evidence of lawmakers’ intentions, the lawmakers will legislate in light 
of those norms, thereby narrowing the gap between the meaning they 
actually intend and the meaning that they will be deemed to have 
intended.  (For instance, if they know their intentions will be interpreted 
as if they had expressed them in standard English, they will try to use 
standard English and not Schmenglish in writing the laws.)  Still, the gap 
between what the interpreter knows the lawmakers actually intended and 
what, per these norms, the interpreter will deem them to have intended 
remains a constant possibility under this version of textualism. 
B.  Position Two: Textualism as Man on the Street Interpretation 
Textualists could be seen as advocating interpreting legal texts as 
would some sample of average members of the public.  Such a method 
might be thought by some to have rule of law benefits, particularly in 
giving the average citizen clear notice of what the law means.  We 
believe that any such theoretical benefits are largely chimerical because 
the position faces a devastating problem of indeterminacy.  One aspect 
of this problem relates to how much background context we ought to 
provide to the average interpreter.  If we take the law to mean whatever 
it would mean to a collection of people who are provided no context 
whatsoever—other than, perhaps, that its authors were English speakers 
and enacted the law on a given date43—then we might as well construct a 
computer program that incorporates dateable dictionaries and rules of 
syntax, grammar, and punctuation and ask the computer to spit out the 
law’s meaning.  On the other hand, if we allow those sampled to use 
their varying understandings of the law’s context—or if we allow them 
to seek further evidence of authorial intent (and if so, how much?)—then 
either their readings will converge on the authoritative interpreter’s (for 
example, the judge’s) reading, in which case, why poll?, or the readings 
will vary from one person to the next.  If the number of people polled is 
more than two, and the number of possible statutory meanings is more 
than two, we may get no dominant meaning from the polling.44  In that 
case, the law will have no authoritative meaning, even though the 
authoritative interpreter (for example, the judge) will be quite confident 
about the meaning intended by the lawmakers.  Whatever the benefits of 
 
 43. The requirement that the language and date be identified—so that those polled 
know which language’s dictionary and grammatical rules to consult—is just a reflection 
of the general point established in Part I, namely, that the meaning of texts is a product 
of authorial intent, and that therefore acontextual meaning is an impossibility. 
 44. This is because of Arrow’s Theorem.  See ARROW, supra note 4.  Furthermore, 
the number of possible meanings of statutes, as opposed to words, typically will be 
greater than two. 
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such an interpretive method—that is, whatever advance notice, however 
uncertain, might be provided to the public about the law’s meaning—we 
do not believe that officials should delegate the assignment of meanings 
to laws to random individuals with varying understandings of what the 
lawmakers were seeking to accomplish. 
Nor does asking one median member of the public instead of several 
members make the polling method more attractive.  It does mitigate the 
problem of no dominant meaning.  But it substitutes an equally daunting 
problem, namely, that of identifying who is the “median” member of the 
public.  Because there is an indefinite number of dimensions on which one 
can identify a median member of the public, the concept of a median 
member of the public is indeterminate.  We will derive different authoritative 
interpretations depending upon the qualities of the median man on the 
street.  Given the indeterminacy of meaning resulting from man on the street 
interpretation, we view the supposed notice benefits of this mode of 
interpretation to be largely imaginary.  The man on the street method will 
not make the public more aware of the law’s meaning.  That is because the 
public will not be able to predict the meaning that will emerge from the 
method due to the indeterminacy of the notion of the median member of 
the public on which the method is based.  And given that the median 
member of the public, however designated and however much evidence 
of authorial intent he is allowed to seek, will be less knowledgeable 
regarding what the lawmakers meant by a legal text than the executive or 
the judge, it is not at all evident why we would want the latter to defer to 
the former in the absence of the benefits of determinate advance notice. 
C.  Position Three: The Idealized Reader 
Textualists frequently have recourse to the construct of an idealized 
contemporaneous (with the enactment) reader and how he would 
interpret the text.  Judge Easterbrook has said that textualists interpret 
language by asking how “a skilled, objectively reasonable user of 
words” would have understood the text.  Justice Scalia has claimed that 
judges should read the federal statutes “as any ordinary Member of 
Congress would have read them, and apply the meaning so 
determined.”45  But of course, textualists do not end here.  Scanning the 
 
 45. The obvious and profound differences between these two idealized readers 
highlight the general failure of textualists to specify the characteristics of the idealized 
reader. 
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case law, John Manning notes two addenda.  Textualists consider the 
context of the statute and also take into account background legal 
conventions.  Hence, the idealized reader is a lawyer (or at least 
someone who knows the standard legal conventions) who knows the 
factual background surrounding the statute’s enactment. 
We have already observed that supplying the idealized reader the 
“context” of the statute is but a backdoor means of reintroducing the 
author’s intent.  Here we wish to make different points about the use of 
the idealized reader.  To begin with, the idealized reader will search for 
clues illuminating the actual author’s intent.  Indeed, we think that 
people, when asked to interpret something, typically seek the actual 
author’s intent as the source of meaning.  (Recall the “autobahn next to 
the sofa” example.)46  This raises the possibility that textualists, in 
creating a construct to generate an “objective” meaning, have instead 
just created an abstraction that merely filters authorial intention.  The 
more (direct or indirect) evidence an idealized reader is given of what an 
author meant by a text, the more the reader will read the text as meaning 
what the author intended. 
Moreover, even if the textualist forbids the idealized reader from 
seeking the intent of the actual author, the idealized reader will still have 
to search for some intent.  If we are correct that one must envision an 
author whenever attempting to make sense of text (indeed to even 
identify it as such), the idealized reader will have to imagine a hypothetical 
author (or authors).  Though there may be certain advantages to treating a 
text generated by a multi member body as if one person created it, one of 
those advantages is not an ability to dispense with the search for intent. 
Assuming that the idealized reader selects a hypothetical author 
(rather than multiple authors), there is a benefit to textualism’s 
abstraction.  With the selection of one author, it becomes much more 
likely that every statute has a meaning.  After all, the more authors a text 
has, the more likely it is that there is no shared intent as to the meaning 
of the text.  And for the intentionalist interested in authorial intent, if 
there is no intent that is shared by the requisite number of legislators, the 
text has no authoritative intention to give it meaning and therefore has 
no meaning.  Hence, if one prefers more meaningful legislation to less, 
there is an advantage to hypothesizing one author when there are 
multiple real authors.47 
 
 46. As noted earlier, some people might eschew actual authorial intentions, 
hypothesize an author, and then seek to divine this imagined author’s intentions.  But if 
the actual author’s will were authoritative for the interpreter—as it typically is in one’s 
mother’s requests, and as it is thought to be when dealing with statutes and 
constitutions—then the actual author’s intentions would be the logical source of meaning. 
 47. Of course, this assumes that we are better off with more legislation rather than 
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Another potential benefit arises if we require that the idealized reader 
be an average member of the general public.  In this situation, if the law 
would be incomprehensible to members of the general public, then there 
is no law, even if a well-versed lawyer would be able to tease out some 
meaning.  Moreover, this approach has the benefit that people generally 
might know what the law requires without having to consult with high 
priced experts or go to court.48 
Unfortunately, most modern textualists assume that their idealized 
reader knows the standard legal conventions and the entire corpus juris.  
Hence, the meanings generated by this reader are unlikely to have any of 
the advance notice and rule of law benefits mentioned above for most 
average folk are unlikely to know either standard legal conventions or 
the entire corpus juris.  If the average Joe attempts to read statutory text, 
he is often likely to identify a meaning that is entirely different from the 
one generated by the textualist’s idealized reader.  It seems to us that the 
only benefit secured by modern textualists is the avoidance of the 
problems with discerning or securing multiple individual intent. 
Of course, this “average reader” approach is itself not strictly 
empirical, nor is it determinate.  It requires us to determine how the 
median reader—not the average reader, since meanings cannot be 
“averaged”—would read a legal text.  To be determinate, we would have 
to spell out all sorts of characteristics of the median reader, such as 
whether he had a median IQ, had a median knowledge of public affairs 
(which is meaningless, since there is no unitary scale of such 
knowledge), was of a median age, had a median geographical location 
(again a meaningless notion), had a median education (again, 
meaningless, since there is no single educational continuum), and so 
forth.  The notion of the idealized reader is, indeed, radically indeterminate.  
And making it more determinate, without making the idealized reader 
into someone who actually knows what we know about the authorial 
 
less.  A textualist extremely dubious of the concept of collective intent might say that we 
are indeed better off with more legislation rather than less, and we would have much less 
if legislation were treated as meaningless in the absence of a collectively shared 
legislative intent.  Other textualists might be happier with less legislation. 
 48. This mode of interpretation differs from the mode discussed in the previous 
section in that in the previous section, the law means whatever it means to a specific, 
real, “average” citizen.  Here we replace a flesh and blood interpreter with a hypothetical 
reader.  The judge is supposed to determine what a hypothetical, average citizen would 
make of a statute.  Of course, our criticisms of the average citizen approach mentioned in 
the previous section apply equally here.  How the judge constructs the qualities of the 
hypothetical, average reader will affect the resulting interpretations. 
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intent, is likely to produce arbitrary stipulations, such as that the 
idealized reader went to public high school in Delaware and reads the 
Washington Post front page cursorily but not the New York Times.49 
Finally, although intentionalists have the aggregate intent problem and 
must face the fact when there are multiple lawmakers, it is possible that 
on some occasions, when no dominant authorial intent and hence no 
dominant meaning will exist, textualists of the idealized reader type have 
a mirror image problem, the problem of a surfeit of meaning.  For the 
idealized reader whom the textualist stipulates, precluded as that reader 
is from looking to all the evidence of actual authorial intent, may 
conclude that a text has two or more meanings that are equally supported 
by the evidence to which he is restricted.  For the textualist, the text then 
just does have these multiple meanings.  There is no deeper metaphysical 
fact, like intent, of which these multiple meanings are merely evidence.  
The multiple meanings just are the metaphysical fact at issue.  The text 
just means two or more things, however silly or pernicious that is as a 
practical matter.50 
D.  Position Four: The Idealized Author 
The final position that a textualist might hold is that legal texts should 
be interpreted by reference not to an idealized reader of the text, but by 
reference to an idealized author.  In other words, legal texts should be 
interpreted to mean what they would have meant had they been authored 
by this single idealized lawmaker rather than by the one or several actual 
lawmakers.51 
The problems with this approach should be obvious.  In order for it to 
yield interpretations, we need to specify the attributes of the idealized 
author.  What language does he speak?  Does he always use primary 
 
 49. The indeterminacy of the idealized reader is due to the countless ways that her 
traits can be stipulated.  The indeterminacy of the average or median reader considered 
in the preceding section is due to the countless dimensions along which one can be 
average or median, some of which (for example, geographical location) do not admit of 
averaging or have a median. 
 50. Occasionally, intentionalists likewise will face situations where evidence of 
meaning is in equipoise.  Yet intentionalists can take satisfaction in knowing that 
intentionalism theoretically always yields no more than one meaning, the meaning 
attributable to the author of the text.  (It may yield no meaning when multiple authors 
mean conflicting things.)  So although textualism sometimes will yield multiple 
meanings, intentionalism will always yield no more than one meaning, even if that 
meaning is sometimes difficult to discern. 
 51. Our colleague Michael Rappaport claims to hold a version of the idealized 
author position, at least for federal constitutional and statutory law, based on his 
understanding that such an interpretive stance was intended by the Framers or Ratifiers 
of the Constitution.  In other words, Rappaport, applying full blooded intentionalism, 
ends up with textualism of the idealized reader variety. 
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definitions of words, or does he sometimes (when?) use secondary 
definitions, or technical definitions, or terms of art?  Is his grammar and 
punctuation perfect?  How rational is he?  How just?  And so on.  How 
we construct the idealized author will determine what the authoritative 
interpretation is.  And the obvious question then is why not construct 
this idealized author to be ideal?  In other words, why not, as Ronald 
Dworkin advocates, “interpret” every law to be the best law it can be?52  
And if we don’t get the best law from assuming the lawmaker is writing 
in standard English, why not assume the lawmaker is writing in 
Schmenglish, a language in which the law would be ideal from the 
interpreter’s vantage point?53  We think this natural progression leading 
to what is in effect the reauthoring of the law by the interpreter is a 
reduction of the position and surely a horrific prospect for self-styled 
textualists. 
***** 
These four positions that textualists could be advocating, given the 
impossibility of IF textualism, appear to us to exhaust the possibilities.  
Positions two, three, and four are, we believe, difficult to defend, even if 
they can be made determinate.  Position one, however, is at least a 
tenable position, though it leads to the possibility that the authoritative 
meaning of the law can differ from the meaning we know was intended, 
perhaps by all the authoring lawmakers.  That does not mean that the 
position is normatively unattractive.  But it does mean that relative to a 
full blooded intentionalist, a policy constrained interpreter of the 
position one variety is less than a faithful agent of the lawmaker. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Sometimes seeming IF textualists make the strong claim that only the 
 
 52. See DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 348. 
 53. Textualists have taken Ronald Dworkin to task for arguing that each statute 
ought to be interpreted as “the best statute it can be”—which will then be equivalent to 
whatever statute the “interpreting” judge thinks Congress should have written.  But 
textualists who create an idealized author have no principled basis for criticizing 
Dworkin.  In untethering meaning from the actual author’s intent and tying it instead to a 
construct, such textualists have done something quite similar to what Dworkin has done.  
In both situations, Congress chooses marks; but whatever marks it chooses, judges 
provide them with meaning without regard to the meaning that Congress meant to 
convey.  The only differences lie in the constraints on the idealized reader. 
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text of statutes is law, and that intent, authorial or otherwise, is not.  This 
is said to follow from constitutional text and structure, where the 
Presentment Clause54 describes how to make law and what constitutes 
the law.  Legislative intent (among other things) never goes through 
bicameralism and is never presented to the President, or so it is claimed.  
Hence, it is not law and must be irrelevant to questions of statutory 
interpretation.  End of inquiry. 
Yet this account of what is relevant to statutory meaning is entirely 
too simplistic.  Everybody, textualist or otherwise, looks beyond the four 
corners of a statute to discern its meaning.  Textualists look at dictionaries, 
context, the extant corpus of law, and their own vocabularies and 
experiences, among other things.  Though none of these goes through 
bicameralism and presentment, they are legitimate considerations 
nonetheless. 
These “extratextual” factors are legitimate for the reason that a statute 
is not simply (or even primarily) its text but is principally its meaning.  
Statutes forbid, compel, or authorize.  Texts alone do not accomplish 
these tasks; meaning does.  The text is just a means of conveying 
meaning, just as a pictogram or utterances are methods of conveying 
meaning.  All of the extratextual factors discussed above help illuminate 
a statute’s meaning; and therefore, though they are extratextual, they are 
not “extrastatutory.”  Those who consult these sources, textualists or not, 
have not run afoul of the Presentment Clause. 
If laws are meanings, and not the text standing alone as a set of marks 
or sounds; and if we are right that meaning is the product of and cannot 
exist without intent; then one must inevitably search for intent to give 
meaning to laws.  Accordingly, searching for intent as a method of 
determining legal meaning is no more illegitimate than examining 
dictionaries and the like to discern legal meaning.  More to the point, the 
Presentment Clause throws up no obstacles to intentionalism. 
Though we have argued that one must search for intent in order to find 
meaning, we have not said much about what constitutes good or bad 
evidence of meaning.  An intentionalist may choose to exclude some 
evidence about authorial intentions on the theory that the evidence may 
be more prejudicial than probative or may be prone to manipulation.  
Hence, IF textualists may be correct in concluding that one ought not 
examine legislative history in finding statutory meaning.  But IF 
textualists would be correct for the wrong reasons.  They would be 
correct not because intent (including legislative history) is irrelevant to 
statutory meaning, but because legislative history might be an unreliable 
indicator of authorial meaning.  We do not have any final views on the 
 
 54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
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value of legislative history in discerning statutory meaning.  We just 
note that the disputes about the merits of IF textualism and 
intentionalism are not primarily about the use of legislative history. 
In sum, to implement a statute, one must first discern its meaning.  In 
discerning statutory meaning, one inevitably will have to consult things 
beyond statutory text.  The dispute between textualists and intentionalists 
superficially concerns which things beyond the text one may examine to 
determine meaning.  But the disagreement is much deeper than that.  If a 
law is but its meaning and meaning is the product of intent, then 
discerning intent must be the goal of every legal interpreter.  The 
normative question must be whose intent matters: the intent of the actual 
lawmakers or that of some construct. 
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 APPENDIX I: TEXTUALISM AND THE FAITHFUL AGENT PREMISE 
Textualists have claimed that textualism “starts from the faithful agent 
premise—that a federal court is responsible for accurately deciphering 
and implementing the legislature’s commands.”55  However, “textualists 
believe that when a statutory text is clear, that is the end of the matter.”56  
Borrowing from interest group and game theory, textualists cite several 
reasons for enforcing objectified intent rather than authorial intent.  For 
instance, “in a complex legislative process that includes agenda 
manipulation and logrolling, it is impossible to reconstruct what a 
legislature would have ‘intended’ if put to a choice between the letter 
and purpose of the law.”57  Moreover, textualism enforces legislative 
compromises that come from the clash of political interests.  Resort to 
intent or purpose has the potential to upset these compromises.58  
Finally, Congress might choose to use rules rather than standards, and 
when it chooses to do so, interpreters should not allow an elusive search 
for intent to potentially upset the decision to have an objective rule.59  
Hence, textualism is more faithful to Congress than are modes of 
interpretation that resort to intent or purpose, or so some textualists have 
claimed. 
Contrary to the claims of textualists, textualists are not faithful agents 
of Congress.  Textualists rightfully presume that Congress is composed of 
individuals who know English and who know general legal conventions 
about how the courts will read statutes.  Hence, in the ordinary course, 
Congress will choose a set of marks that when interpreted by the 
reasonable reader will generate the meaning that members intended to 
convey.  But if Congress mistakenly provides that “carp” shall be fitted 
with emission controls rather than “cars” as the members of Congress 
intended, textualists, eschewing evidence of what Congress intended, 
may read the law to require emission controls on fish.  This mode of 
interpretation is more accurately described as being faithful to a 
hypothetical author rather than to the actual authors. 
To see the unfaithfulness of textualism, consider this analogy.  If a 
grandmother requests that her grandson not marry “outside the faith,” by 
which she means that her son should marry a Lutheran, the grandson 
who knows what his grandmother means by “the faith” is unfaithful to 
his grandmother’s wishes if he subsequently marries a Catholic.  That is 
 
 55. Manning, supra note 21, at 7. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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so even if a reasonable ecumenical, American listener would proclaim 
that Catholicism and Lutheranism are both part of the same faith, 
namely, Christianity.  The grandson may protest that he is being faithful 
to her objectified meaning, but he has merely allowed his grandmother 
to choose the vocalizations and has delegated the meaning of her request 
to the hypothetical reasonable listener.  He might even declare that 
holding his grandmother to objectified meaning will give her the proper 
incentives to follow standard English usage and grammar—she will be a 
better English speaker for it.  But in the end, whether or not he has been 
faithful to some objectified meaning, he clearly has been unfaithful to 
her. 
Textualists acknowledge that Congress has the right to place a set of 
marks on a page.  But they forbid Congress from selecting the meaning 
of those marks.  Instead, the meanings of those marks are supposed to be 
fixed according to a set of rules that are (relatively) independent of 
Congress.  Should Congress intend secondary or nonstandard meanings, 
it may well have its will thwarted; for the reasonable reader, if so 
constructed, may generate an objectified meaning that ignores 
Congress’s intended secondary or tertiary meanings.  Whatever the 
merits of textualism, it does not strike us as a theory where the 
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APPENDIX II: THE LAWMAKER’S INTENDED MEANING                          
VERSUS THE LAWMAKER’S INTENDED GOALS 
The intentionalist interprets legal texts, like all texts, by reference to 
their intended meanings.  Legal texts not only have intended meanings, 
however; legal texts are meant to achieve certain goals.  But the goals 
they are meant to achieve are not the same thing as the meanings they 
are intended to convey. 
Consider again your mom’s request that you put the “autobahn” next 
to the sofa.  What she means is that you put the ottoman next to the sofa.  
What the purpose—the more general intent—behind her request is may 
be that she wants to prop her feet up on the ottoman.  But perhaps she is 
unaware that the ottoman is broken and will not support her feet.  She 
has thus made two mistakes.  She uttered “autobahn” meaning the thing 
commonly referred to as an “ottoman.”  When told that “autobahn” 
commonly refers to a German highway, she can truthfully say that that is 
not what she meant when she used the term. 
But she also made a mistake about what would make her comfortable.  
When she discovers, after you pull up the ottoman, that it will not 
support her feet, her correct response is that although she did request the 
ottoman, she made a mistake in doing so. 
Let us label the first sort of mistake a mistake about what to say to 
convey what one means.  Intentionalists will want to correct those 
mistakes.  Indeed, as Part I argues, sayings are merely conveyances for 
intended meanings.  They can be ill chosen, as your mom’s expression 
would have been had she addressed her request to a stranger.  But if we 
know the intended meaning, the manner of its conveyance, and whether 
it would have been ill chosen in different circumstances, is ultimately of 
no consequence. 
Textualists frequently imply, however, that intentionalists also want to 
correct the second kind of mistake that your mom has made, namely, a 
mistake regarding whether what she meant to say would accomplish 
what she intended to accomplish by saying it.  John Manning, for 
instance, in criticizing the absurdity doctrine, argues that it is employed 
to correct not merely lapses in expression, but also lapses in foresight.60  
Elsewhere he implies that the doctrine is employed to correct deviations 
from values that the legislature is presumed to hold.61  But intentionalists, 
while recognizing that a gross mismatch between what a lawmaker 
intended to accomplish and a candidate meaning is evidence that the 
 
 60. Manning, supra note 33, at 2401. 
 61. Id. at 2407. 
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meaning was not the intended one, do not advocate departing from the 
intended meaning whenever the interpreter concludes the lawmaker 
made a mistake regarding what that meaning would accomplish or how 
well that meaning serves the lawmaker’s values.  In your mom’s case, 
the faithful agent intentionalist will pull up an ottoman rather than an 
autobahn, but he will not feel bound by her request to pull up something 
more comfortable than the ottoman merely because he might believe that 
she has a more general intent to be comfortable.  The intentionalist does 
not advocate ascending up the ladder of generality of intention, at the 
pinnacle of which all laws turn out to be the Spike Lee law: do the right 
thing.  He only advocates honoring the intent of the lawmaker at the 
specific level of generality that the lawmaker meant to convey, even if at 

























 62. Sometimes, of course, it may be difficult to disentangle mistakes that affect 
meaning from those that do not.  See Alexander, supra note 38, at 376–77. 
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